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The Two Faces of Justice in the
Post-Soviet Legal Sphere:
Adversarial Procedure, Jury Trial,
Plea-Bargaining and the Inquisitorial
Legacy
STEPHEN C THAMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Our obtuse, our blinkered, our hulking brute of a judicial system can live only if
it is infallible.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago.1
THE SOVIET CRIMINAL justice system fits squarely into thehierarchical, policy-implementing (and traditionally inquisitorial)model that Mirjan Damaška elaborated in his book The Faces of
Justice and State Authority.2 The overarching policy of Communist Party
officialdom was one of no acquittals. This policy was dutifully carried out
by its cadre of criminal justice officials from the police, criminal investiga-
tor (sledovatel), prosecutor (prokuror), and trial and appellate judge, as the
raw material of the case, the dossier, made its way along the assembly
line.3
The 15 republics which became independent after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 19914 inherited this system and are attempting to reform it
1 A Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago vol 3 (London, Fontana, 1979) 520.
2 MR Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1986) 11–17.
3 Many innocent suffered. According to a 1986 study, approximately 2,500 citizens were
‘illegally arrested’ and more than 3,000 wrongfully prosecuted each year. T Foglesong,
‘Habeas Corpus or Who Has the Body? Judicial Review of Arrest and Pretrial Detention in
Russia’ (1996) 14 Wisconsin International Law Journal 541, 547–48.
4 I will use the first two letters of these republics when referring to their codes and
constitutions, which are listed in Appendix A: Armenia (AR), Azerbaijan (AZ), Belarus (BE),
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by introducing institutions from what Damaška calls the co-ordinate,
problem-solving (and largely non-inquisitorial, that is, adversarial) systems
of justice modeled upon Anglo-American criminal procedure.5
This essay will focus on three of these institutions, adversary procedure,
plea bargaining, and jury trial. Jury trial and adversary procedure were
already articulated as principles for criminal justice reform during the Soviet
perestroika period6 and became the keystones of the 1991 Concept of
Judicial Reform of the Russian Republic,7 the most comprehensive blueprint
for judicial reform to be drafted in post-Soviet lands. They sought to
improve the quality of the evidence presented to the trier of fact through
adversarial testing, and to liberate the trial judge from dependence on the
prosecutor and executive organs. Juries would enable the court to acquit
when the evidence was clearly insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence. Plea-bargaining and guilty pleas were part of a later reform
agenda and were introduced for reasons of procedural economy.8 We will
discuss the impact of these reforms and assess whether they have led to an
improvement in the quality of the evidence presented to the trier of fact, a
liberation of the trial and appellate judges from the juggernaut of hierarchi-
cal Soviet ‘crime control’ policies, and the development of a culture where
acquittals of guilty and innocent will be tolerated when the evidence lacks
credibility or is insufficient to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. FROM INQUISITORIAL TO ADVERSARIAL TRIAL?
The Preliminary Investigation and the Preparation of the Dossier
The Lack of Adversariality in the Preliminary Investigation
The raw material of the Soviet inquisitorial assembly line of pre-
determined justice was the dossier, which each official inspected, added
value to, and stamped for quality as it passed to the next stage of
production. Each official, from police to trial and appellate judge, had the
same duty: to ‘take all measures provided by law for the all-sided, complete
Estonia (ES), Georgia (GE), Kazakhstan (KA), Kyrgyzstan (KY), Latvia (LA), Lithuania (LI),
Moldova (MO), Russia (RU), Tajikistan (TA), Turkmenistan (TU), Ukraine (UK), and
Uzbekistan (UZ). I will also refer to the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for the
Commonwealth of Independent States (1996), which had a great influence on the reforms in
all but the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
5 Damaška, above n 2, at 11–17.
6 See SC Thaman, ‘The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia’ (1995) 31 Stanford
Journal of International Law 61, 70.
7 See Ibid 72–74, for a discussion of the ‘Concept of Judicial Reform.’
8 MR Damaška, ‘Models of Criminal Procedure’ (2001) 51 Zbornik (collected papers of
Zagreb Law School) 477, 485.
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and objective investigation of the circumstances of the case’ – that is, to
ascertain the truth, the quintessential goal of inquisitorial justice.9
Today, the constitutions of several10 and the Codes of Criminal Proce-
dure of nearly all post-Soviet republics11 prescribe ‘adversarial procedure’
(sostiazatel’nost’) and equality of arms as governing principles, but com-
mentators tend to limit them to the trial stage of procedure.12 No
post-Soviet codes accord the defence broad adversarial rights at the
preliminary investigation, and, in particular, do not allow the defence to be
present when witnesses are being interviewed or other evidence gathered.13
Few of the post-Soviet republics14 have instituted pre-trial procedures to
preserve witness testimony which guarantee the right to confrontation
required by international conventions to which the post-Soviet republics
are parties.15
9 S 20 Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks RSFSR, Affirmed by Supreme Soviet of the
RSFSR. 27 Oct 1960 published in Zakony RSFSR I Postanovleniia Verkhovnogo soveta
RSFSR (Moskva, Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR, 1960). The CCP-RSFSR, virtually identical to the
codes in force in the other 14 Soviet Republics, will be used as the Soviet-era model. Similar
language is still found in CCP-TA s 15(1); CCP-draft-TU s 23; CCP-UZ s 15. The judge, as
last in line, was obligated to ratify the results of the officials who preceded him. TG
Morshchakova, Rossiyskoe pravosudie v kontekste sudebnoy reformy (2004) 178.
10 Art 123(3) Const-RU provides that ‘court procedure is realised on the basis of
adversary procedure and equality of the parties.’ For similar sections, see Art 148, Const-AZ,
Art 115, para 1, Const-BE, Art 85(3) Const-GE, Art 129(3) Const-UK.
11 CCP-AR s 23(1); CCP-AZ s 32(1); CCP-BE s 24(1); CCP-ES s 14(1); CCP-GE s 49;
CCP-KA s 23(1); CCP-KY s 18(1); CCP-LI s 7(1); CCP-RU s 15; CCP-Draft-TU s 22(1);
CCP-UK s 16–1.
12 See IF Demidov, ‘Proekt UPK v svete ego osnovnykh poniatiy’ in Sudebnaia reforma v
Rossii: problemy sovershenstvovaniia protsessual’nogo zakonodatel’stva (Moskva, R Valent,
2001) 230, 236. On the inquisitorial nature of the American pre-trial, see McNeil v
Wisconsin, 501 US 171, 181 (1991). Soviet theorists felt that the investigator could
incorporate the roles of accuser, defender and judge within himself and maintain complete
neutrality. Mikhaylovskaia, below n 52, at 9–10.
13 A right to participate is usually granted only with ‘permission’ of the investigator: see
Model Code s 104(1)(3), as well as CCP-AR s 73(1)(3); CCP-KA s 69(2); CCP-KY
s 40(1)(11); CCP-UK s 48(4). In RU there is also no express right to counsel during
confrontations between witnesses, CCP-RU s 192, or line-ups involving the defendant,
CCP-RU s 193.
14 For exceptions, see CCP-LI ss 179, 234; CCP-MO s 109(3). For a discussion on the
trend to ‘adversarialise’ the preliminary hearing see SC Thaman, Comparative Criminal
Procedure: A Casebook Approach (Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2002) 37–38.
15 Art 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) and Art
14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR)
guarantee the right to confront the state’s witnesses. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are bound by the ECHR and all the
republics are bound by the ICCPR.
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‘Long Live the Queen!’ Confessions as the Queen of Evidence
The coerced confession was traditionally the centerpiece of nearly all
Soviet-era prosecutions despite its inherent unreliability.16 This has
changed little in post-Soviet times.17 The investigator assembles the rest of
the dossier – witness statements, expert opinions, reports of investigative
acts – to corroborate the ‘truth’ of the confession.
The move from inquisitorial to adversary procedure should signify a
demotion of the search for truth, to the level of other important values
protected by modern constitutions such as the right to privacy, the right to
human dignity, the right to due process, etc.18 Many of the post-Soviet
republics have paid lip service to these rights by making exclusion of
illegally gathered evidence a constitutional command;19 and by enacting
provisions broader than those in most countries, excluding evidence
gathered in violation of constitutional20 as well as mere statutory norms.21
But although the right to remain silent is guaranteed in nearly all the
post-Soviet republics,22 and defendants must be advised of this right and
16 R Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York, OUP, 1990) 121–24.
Vyshinskiy and others have called the confession the ‘queen of evidence’. SC Thaman,
‘Miranda in Comparative Law’ (2001) 45 Saint Louis University Law Journal 581.
17 In Russia, it has been estimated that up to 50% of all criminal defendants, and 80% of
those who refuse to admit guilt, are subject to torture or ill-treatment. The practices include
asphyxiation, beatings, electroshock, threats and use of fellow prisoners to mistreat uncoop-
erative suspects. D Lohman, Confessions at any cost: police torture in Russia (New York,
Human Rights Watch, 1999) 1, 21, 36. On the use of coerced confessions in Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Ukraine, see NP Kovalev, Lay Adjudication Reforms in the Transitional Criminal
Justice Systems of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Doctoral Dissertation, Belfast,
Queen’s University, 2007) 136, 139, 347. For evidence that this practice exists in all
post-Soviet republics, see ‘US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’
(2006), available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/> accessed 15 June 2008.
18 On exclusionary rules related to the determination of truth, and those based in other
important values, see MR Damaška, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure’ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506,513.
19 Art 42(2) Const-AR; Art 71(3) Const-AZ; Art 27(2) Const-BE; Art 42(7) Const-GE;
Art 77(3)(9) Const-KA; Art 89(2) Const-KY; Art 50 Const.-RU; Art 62(3) Const-UK.
20 In CCP-LA s 130(2,3), the court will weigh whether a violation was ‘substantial’ and
decide admissibility based thereon, unless the procedure involved use of force, threats,
coercion, or violation of basic principles of criminal procedure.
21 For provisions including mere statutory violations: CCP-BE s 105(4); CCP-GE s 7(6);
CCP-KA s 116(4); CCP-KY s 6(3); CCP-LI s 19(4); CCP-RU s 75(1). For a comparison of
modern approaches, see SC Thaman, ‘Wahrheit oder Rechtsstaatlichkeit: die Verwertung von
verfassungswidrig erlangten Beweisgegeständen im Strafverfahren’ in J Arnold et al (eds),
Menschengerechtes Strafrecht: Festschrift für Albin Eser zum 70. Geburtstag (München, CH
Beck, 2005) 1042–44.
22 Art 42(1) Const-AR; Art 74 Const-AZ; Art 27, para 1, Const-BE; Art. 22(3) Const-ES;
Art. 42(8) Const.-GE; Art. 77(3)(7) Const-KA; Art. 51 Const-RU; Art. 63, para 1, Const-UK.
It is statutorily guaranteed in: Model Code s 25(1) and CCP-AR s 20(1); CCP-AZ s 20(1);
CCP-BE s 10(4); CCP-GE s 73(1)(b); CCP-KY s 12(2); CCP-MO s 21; CCP-RU s 47(4)(3);
CCP-draft-TU s 25(1); CCP-UK s 63, para 1.
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the right to counsel before being interrogated,23 the right may be waived
and police and investigators routinely use illegal methods to obtain such
waivers. This fact led Russia to introduce a strict exclusionary rule which
applies to confessions taken in the absence of counsel, if the defendant
retracts the confession at trial.24 Nevertheless, Russian police and investi-
gators have found a way around this protection by using the so-called
‘pocket lawyer’ (karmanyy advokat), who actively work with the investi-
gator or police in encouraging the suspect to confess and on occasion
watch while the suspect is tortured.25
The File at Trial: Undermining the Presumption of Innocence and the
Right to Confrontation
Today, as in Soviet times, the trial judge is either the sole trier of fact, or
clearly calls the shots as part of a collegial mixed court of ‘people’s
assessors’ (commonly known as ‘nodders’), who are responsible for decid-
ing all questions of fact, law, guilt and sentence.26 The only exceptions are
the tiny amount of jury trials provided for in Russian law.27
In Soviet theory, adversary procedure could co-exist with an active trial
judge who was obligated to ascertain the truth28 and this position still finds
support today.29 However, the predominant theory now entrenched in
23 CCP-AR s 211(3); CCP-AZ ss 90(7)(10), 232(4); CCP-ES ss 34, 75(2); CCP-GE
s 310(2,3); CCP-KA ss 114, 216(3), 217(2); CCP-KY s 191(2); CCP-LA ss 150, 265(1);
CCP-MO ss 64(2), 104(1); CCP-RU ss 173, 47(4)(3,8); CCP-draft-TU s 255(3). See also
Model Code ss 252(3), 253(8). Only in CCP-TA ss 53.1, 412.11 and CCP-UZ s 47, para 2,
does one find the old Soviet admonition which is limited to the ‘right to give evidence’. Cf
CCP-RSFSR s 47, para 2.
24 CCP-RU s 75(2)(1). Kommentariy (2002), below n 49, at 206.
25 The lawyer will then be a witness for the prosecution that no torture was used.
Confessions at any cost: police torture in Russia, above n 17, at 66. Many ‘pocket lawyers’
actually share their fees with the investigators who invite them to perform such a role.
Marogulova, above n 12, at 54.
26 Thaman, above n 6, at 67. ‘People’s assessors’ have also been called ‘pawns in the
hands of the judge’ and ‘wordless judges’. VV Mel’nik, Iskusstvo dokazazyvaniia w
sostiazatel’nom ugolovnom protsesse (Moskva, Delo, 2000) 19. On the ‘ritual’ of lay
participation on the European Continent, see Damaška, above n 2, at 33. On how the
Belarussian and Uzbek mixed courts have not been perceived to have gained independence
since Soviet times, see N Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication of Crimes in the Commonwealth of
Independent States: An Independent and Impartial Jury or a “Court of Nodders”?’ (2004) 11
Journal of East European Law 123, 136, 153–54.
27 It has been estimated, following the Russian abolition of the mixed court and turn to
jury trial, that there will be lay participation in only 0.8% of criminal cases. S Pashin, ‘Who
Needs a Dependent Judge?’ Moscow Times, 2 July 2001, 10.
28 This was the position of A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, Minister of Justice during the late Stalinist
period. IB Mikhaylovskaia, Tseli, funktsii i printsipy Rossiyskogo ugolovnogo sudoproizvod-
stva (Moskva, Prospekt, 2003) 69.
29 VI Zazhitskiy, ‘Istina i sredstva ee ustanovleniia v UPK RF: teoretiko-pravovoy analiz’
(2005) 6 Gosudarstvo i Pravo, at 67. According to a commentary edited by, among others,
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Russia and the majority of the post-Soviet republics is that a tri-partite
division of labour between prosecution, defence and court, is the crucial
factor in achieving adversariality.30 This theory, of course, requires a
passive judge no longer responsible for the ascertainment of truth in the
matter.31
The turn to adversary procedure, however, has not led to a change in the
trial role of the judge sufficient to guarantee the required neutrality in most
of the new codes. It is still the trial judge, who in nearly all trials is also the
trier of the facts, who is obligated to read the entire dossier of the
preliminary investigation and certify that the evidence is sufficient legally
and factually for the trial court to potentially return a guilty judgment.32
This procedure undermines the presumption of innocence by requiring a
‘pre-judging’ of the merits of the case which should disqualify the judge as
a trier of fact at the trial.33
Today the parties decide which evidence is presented at trial, whereas in
Soviet times this role was carried out by the judge, who was in effect an
ersatz prosecutor in more than half of all criminal cases because the
prosecutor was not obligated to appear.34 Most codes no longer require the
trial judge to ascertain the truth, but rather to ‘create the necessary
conditions for the fulfillment by the parties of their procedural duties and
the realisation of the rights accorded them.’35 Observers in Russia,
the presidents of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan, one can even
have adversary procedure if the prosecutor does not appear in court and the defendant must
defend himself alone in front of the judge! II Rogov, ‘St 23-Osushchestvlenie sudoproizvod-
stva na osnove sostiazatel’nosti i ravnopraviia storon’ in II Rogov, SF Bychkova and KA
Mami (eds), Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respublika Kazakhstan (Obshchaia chast’)
Kommentariy (Almaty, Zheti Zharfy, 2002) 67–8.
30 Model Code s 28; CCP-AR s 23; CCP-BE s 24; CCP-KA s 23; CCP-Draft-TU s 22;
CCP-UK s 16–1. The separation of powers aspect is stressed in CCP-ES s 14(1), CCP-LA s 17,
CCP-LI s 7(2); CCP-MO s 24; CCP-RU s 15. The phrase ‘adversary procedure’ is not
mentioned in the codes of LA and MO.
31 Damaška, above n 2, at 3.
32 CCP-RSFSR s 222. This procedure was recommended in Model Code s 221(1) and still
is found in CCP-AR s 292; CCP-LI s 228(1); CCP-RU ss 227–231; CCP-TA s 222; CCP-
draft-TU s 330(2); CCP-UK s 245.
33 On this ‘preconceived opinion as to guilt’ imbued by study of the dossier, see KJ
Mittermaier, Das Volksgericht in Gestalt der Schwur- und Schöffengerichte (Berlin, CG
Lüderitz, 1866) 22. As to whether Continental European systems take the presumption of
innocence ‘somewhat less seriously’ due to such trial arrangements, see Damaška, above n 8,
at 491. There was no question of this in the USSR, where the presumption of innocence was
impugned as ‘bourgeios.’ IL Petrukhin, Teoreticheskie osnovy reformy ugolovnogo protsessa
v Rossii: Part II (Moskva, Prospekt, 2005) 122. On how this ‘file prejudice’ poisoned the
Soviet-Russian trial, see LM Karnozova, Vozrozhdennyy Sud Prisiazhnykh (Moskva, Nota
Bene, 2000) 155.
34 Thaman, above n 6, at 67.
35 See Model Code s 28(4), and CCP-AR s 23(4); CCP-BE s 24(5); CCP-GE s 15(5);
CCP-KA s 23(6); CCP-KY s 18(6); CCP-MO s 314(2); CCP-RU s 15; CCP-draft-TU
s 22(1)(6); CCP-UK s 16–1; CCP-UZ s 25, para 6.
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however, report that judges still do the lion’s share of questioning of
defendants and witnesses in patent disregard for the new procedure.36
The trial still opens in most post-Soviet republics by asking the defend-
ant whether he admits the charges, and wants to testify; usually preceded
by an admonition of the right to remain silent.37 This procedure is
problematic in light of the defendant’s presumption of innocence38 and the
prosecution’s burden to prove guilt. In Soviet times the defendant nearly
always testified, either admitting guilt and hoping for lenience in sentenc-
ing in the unified guilt and penalty phase proceedings39 or retracting his
pre-trial confession and contesting the charges.40 Little has changed in this
respect.41 The often coerced pre-trial confession of the defendant is read in
court, whether or not the defendant remains silent or contests its validity,42
because trial courts uniformly refuse to suppress them despite the widely-
acknowledged use of torture and other coercion.43 In Russia, the defence
may not even attack the credibility of the prior statement at trial by
alleging unlawful methods, for the Supreme Court of Russia (SCRF) has
ruled that such allegations are grounds for reversing acquittal judgments.44
As in Soviet times, the new codes do not treat the reading of the written
material in the investigative dossier as a violation of the otherwise-
guaranteed principles of an ‘oral’ and ‘immediate’ trial.45 All reports of
36 Basmannoe pravosudie: Uroki samooborony. Posobie dlia advokatov (2004) 25 (a
study of one Moscow court in October 2003).
37 CCP-RSFSR s 278. CCP-AR s 334(2); CCP-GE s 472; CCP-KA s 346; CCP-LI ss 267,
268; CCP-RU ss 273–275; CCP-TA s 280, para 3; CCP-draft-TU s 388; CCP-UK s 299. On
this tradition of inquisitorial procedure, see Damaška. above n 18, at 506, 525.
38 The presumption of innocence has constitutional and statutory protection in most
republics. See Art 41, Const-AR; Art 71(1,2) Const-AZ; Art 40 Const-GE; Art 77(3)(1)
Const-KA; Art 92 Const-LA; Art 31(1) Const-LI; Art 21 Const-MO; Art 49(1) Const-RU; Art
62 Const-UK; and CCP-BE s 16; CCP-ES s 7; CCP-KY s 15; CCP-draft-TU s 18(1).
39 On how the pressure of a single phase trial leads nearly all continental European
defendants to testify at trial, see Damaška, above n 18, at 527.
40 The typical Russian trial consisted in the defendant’s confession to investigative
authorities and his subsequent retraction thereof at trial: H Franz, Die Hauptverhandlung im
russischen Strafverfahren (Berlin, Verlag Dr. Köster, 2000) 70–72.
41 Basmannoe pravosudie, above n 36, at 76.
42 See for example, CCP-AR s 337(1); CCP-KA s 349(1); CCP-KY s 289(1); CCP-MO
s 368(1); CCP-RU s 276(1); CCP-Draft-TU s 391.
43 Kovalev, above n 17, at 136. As to this practice in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, see
USDOS, above n 17; Confessions, above n 17, at 7, 68, 76. Judges have estimated that at least
one-third and probably more of all convictions are based on coerced confessions. P Finn, ‘For
Russians, Police Rampage Fuels Fear’ Washington Post, 27 Mar 2005, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4009–2005Mar26.html.
44 On the massive reversal of acquittals on this basis, see SC Thaman, ‘The Nullification
of the Russian Jury: Lessons for Jury Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond’ (2007) 40
Cornell International Law Journa 357, at 377–78l; See Karnozova, above n 33, at 352 n 19;
For a similar ruling regarding commenting on coercion used against witnesses to induce their
pre-trial statements, Kovalev, above n 17, at 347.
45 CCP-RSFSR s 240, para 1. Compare CCP-BE s 286; CCP-GE s 440(1); CCP-KA
s 311(1); CCP-KY s 253(1); CCP-LA s 449(3); CCP-LI s 237(1); CCP-RU s 240; CCP-TA
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investigative acts (arrests, searches, etc) and documents may be read to the
trier of fact,46 along with statements of witnesses who do not appear in
court.47 This unreformed approach to the use of hearsay and written
evidence which has been prepared in inquisitorial secrecy by law enforce-
ment organs appears to violate the rights to equality of arms and
confrontation.48
In 2001 the CCP-RU 2001 took a hopeful step by excluding all prior
statements of witnesses or victims if they failed to appear at trial, unless
both parties stipulated otherwise,49 but pressure by the procuracy led to a
return to the old Soviet rule.50 The file thus continues to act ‘in the wings
of the trial like the prompter at an amateur play.’51
Returning the Case for Supplementary Investigation to Avoid Acquittals
Under the Soviet-era codes a judge could refuse to acquit when there was
clearly insufficient evidence of guilt if he/she was not convinced of the
defendant’s innocence and felt further investigation was required for an
‘all-sided, complete and objective investigation of the circumstances neces-
sary and sufficient to decide the case.’ The case would then be returned to
the investigator to look for such hypothetical evidence.52 The issue was
s 241; CCP-draft-TU s 351; CCP-UZ s 26. This is also the approach of German law, see C
Roxin, Strafverfahrensrecht 24 edn (München, Beck, 1995) 335. ‘Immediacy means that the
trier of fact should directly hear the evidence. Ibid.
46 See CCP-RSFSR ss 69, para 2, 87, 88, 292, which was included in Model Code
ss 142(2), 156(2), 396 and is virtually replicated in: CCP-AR ss 104(2)(8,9), 121(2); CCP-AZ
ss 124(2)(4,5), 134(2); CCP-BE ss 88(2), 338; CCP-GE s 110(2)(f,g); CCP-KA ss 122(1), 357;
CCP-KY ss 81(2)(4,5), 89, 90, 299; CCP-LA ss 135, 137, 229(1); CCP-LI ss 92(1)(1), 286;
CCP-MO ss 93(2)(4,5), 373; CCP-RU ss 83, 84; CCP-TA ss 62, 295; CCP-draft-TU
ss 124(2)(4,5), 400; CCP-UZ ss 81, 443.
47 See Model Code s 391(1), and CCP-AR ss 337(1), 342(1); CCP-AZ s 329(1) CCP-BE
s 333; CCP-ES s 291 CCP-GE s 481(1); CCP-KA s 353; CCP-KY s 294 CCP-LA s 501;
CCP-LI s 272; CCP-MO s 371; CCP-RU s 281; CCP-TA s 289; CCP-draft-TU s 395(1);
CCP-UK s 306; CCP-UZ s 104.
48 Which the ECHR and ICCPR make binding on all republics. See above n 15. The US
also prohibits the reading of prior statements that have not been subject to cross-examination
by the defence. Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004).
49 CCP-RU s 281 (2001), in DN Kozak & YB Mizulina (eds), Kommentariy k ugolovno-
protsessual’nomu kodeksu Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moskva, Yurist’, 2002) 309.
50 CCP-RU s 281(2). See S Pomorski, ‘Modern Russian Criminal Procedure: The Adver-
sarial Principle and Guilty Plea’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 129, 144, who calls the
changes a ‘throwback to the Soviet past’.
51 Damaška, above n 2, at 50, 53. Pomorski, above n 50, at 142, calls it the ‘backbone’ of
the trial.
52 See PH Solomon Jr, ‘The Case of the Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms and the
Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice’ (1987) 39 Soviet Studies 531. For a characterisation of the
practice as a ‘fetishisation’ of truth-finding obliging the court to redo that which the organs of
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phrased as an ‘insufficiency of evidence’ upon which to acquit a defend-
ant.53 Acquittals were seen as a blemish on the work of law enforcement
organs and required compensation of those acquitted for unlawful pre-trial
detention,54 so cases with insufficient evidence either disappeared upon
return to the investigative stage, or ended with guilty judgments for
unfounded lesser offences.55
The Criminal Code of Procedure of Russia of 2001 eliminated the return
of the case for supplementary investigation in its traditional form,56
inspired by an April 1999 decision of the Russian Constitutional Court
(CCRF) which declared that, among other principles, it violated the
presumption of innocence and the right to adversary procedure.57 In
December 2003, however, the CCRF backed off its earlier ruling and
declared the unconstitutionality of the new provision on the grounds that it
violates the victim’s right to access to justice.58 Now the victim or
prosecutor may seek to remove a case from the trier of fact to ‘restore
rights of the victim or the accused violated by law enforcement agencies.’59
This was a clear victory for the prosecutor’s office, which has finally
succeeded in giving priority to the rights of the victim over those of the
defendant.60 Law enforcement organs can now intentionally violate the
the preliminary investigation were unable to do properly do. IB Mikhaylovskaia, ‘Sotsial’noe
naznachenie ugolovnoy yustitsii i tsel’ ugolovnogo protsessa’ (2005) 5 Gosudarstvo i pravo,
111, 116.
53 This language is still found in: CCP-BE s 302(5); CCP-GE ss 426(1)(a), 501. For an
excellent discussion of the Soviet concept of doubts ‘that cannot be eliminated during the
pre-trial investigation and trial (neustranimye somneniia)’ see Kovalev, above n 17, at
351–53.
54 In the ‘system of statistical evaluation of judicial activity’ which dominated in the
USSR and Russia, an acquittal was seen as a ‘defect.’ Morshchakova, above n 9, at 178.
55 In more than half of the cases returned for further investigation judges find the
defendant guilty on clearly insufficient evidence but sentence them to credit for time served,
resulting in their release. See Confessions …, above n 17, at 120–22.
56 CCP-RU s 237 limited such motions to the stage of the preliminary hearing and
restricted the substance of such motions to the correction of errors which prevent a valid
judgment from being rendered, or to cases where the accusatory pleading was not handed to
the accused. The procurator was given five days to cure these defects.
57 See Thaman, above n 14, at 181–83.
58 Now that Russia’s reform has been aborted, the procedure, found in Model Code
ss 348, 362, continues to exist in CCP-AR ss 297, 311, 363; CCP-BE s 302(5); CCP-GE
ss 426(1)(a), 501; CCP-KA ss 303, 323(1); CCP-KY s 244(3); CCP-LA s 462(3) (when
prosecutor wants to amend charges during trial to detriment of defendant); CCP-TA ss 233,
260, 310; CCP-UK s 281; CCP-UZ s 419. The European Court of Human Rights condemned
Ukraine for violating the ECHR right to a fair trial, in part on a complaint that returning the
case for further investigation violated the right to a fair trial. Salov v Ukraine, paras 78–98
(decision of 6 Sept 2005).
59 Decision of 8 Dec 2003, reprinted in VG Strekozov (ed) Konstitutsionnyy sud
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Postanovleniia, Opredeleniia (Moskva, Yurist’, 2003) 4–5.
60 On the long-time quest of a noted professor in the institute of the procuracy to
establish the priority of the rights of the victim over those of the defendant and for
maintaining the returning of the case for further investigation. See Franz, above n 40, at
141–44.
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rights of the victim and then rely on the victim to reassert those rights
during trial, after it becomes clear that the evidence will be insufficient for
a conviction.
The Acquittal-Free Post-Soviet Landscape
A ‘no-acquittals’ policy still exists in Russia, and effectively converts the
trial court into a mere sentencing court which imposes the judgment
sanctioned in advance by the prosecutor in the accusatory pleading.61 This
turn away from the spirit of the Concept of Judicial Reform could be a
result of the nearly total domination of Russian democracy by the
executive branch under President Putin and its ‘power ministries’ (siloviki)
such as the FSB (successor to the KGB), and, for purposes of criminal
procedure, the procuracy, and the unwillingness or incapacity of the
judiciary to buck this trend.
In the first three years following passage of the CCP-RU in 2001, the
overall acquittal rate (including jury trials) rose from 0.3 per cent to 0.9
per cent.62 Acquittal rates are likely not higher in other post-Soviet
republics.63 Since post-Soviet reform efforts to bolster the independence of
the judiciary from executive organs and the procuracy have largely proved
unsuccessful,64 and because the Soviet-era mixed courts with their ‘nod-
ding’ people’s assessors are an ineffective counterweight to politically
dependent judges, the classic jury still appears to be the only means to
facilitate acquittals in cases which lack sufficient credible evidence of guilt.
61 S Pomorski, ‘Justice in Siberia: a case study of a lower criminal court in the city of
Krasnoyarsk’ (2001) 34 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 447, 456–58. Three-judge
panels in Russia, an alternative to trial by jury, acquitted none of the 1,564 persons coming
before them in the years 1994–1998. Mel’nik, above n 26, at 42. To enforce this ‘no-
acquittals’ policy, the SCRF routinely reverses a much higher percentage of acquittals (which
constitute less than 0.5 % of all judgments) than they do of convictions. For instance, in 1996
it reversed 29.4% of acquittals and only 2.2% of convictions and in 1997, 33.1% of
acquittals and only 2.5% of convictions. Confessions, above n 17, at 118–19.
62 Petrukhin, above n 33, at 101.
63 For some sample acquittal rates: 0.25% in Armenia in 2003, 0.27% and 0.26% in
Ukraine in 2002 and 2003: less than 0.5% in Belarus in 1998; 0.57% and 0.81% in
Kazakhstan in 2002 and 2003; 0.45%, 0.47%, 0.67% and 0.74% in Georgia in the years
2000–2003, see Kovalev, above n 17, at 135. A no acquittal policy is also rigidly enforced in
Turkmenistan. Ibid 125.
64 USDOS, above n 17, report on nearly universal corruptness of the judiciary and its
dependence on the executive branch and/or procuracy in all except the Baltic republics, and
problems with corruption in Latvia. Compare, Kovalev, above n 17, at 123–25.
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III. PLEA BARGAINING: EMPOWERMENT OF THE DEFENCE OR
INQUISITORIAL INDUCEMENT TO CONFESS?
Introduction
As Damaška has noted, the inducement of confessions through procedural
arrangements in the hierarchical inquisitorial procedures of the European
continent, made it unnecessary for those countries to engage in American
style bargaining for guilty pleas.65 The procedurally induced confession
was only ‘evidence,’ from which the court could infer guilt, for a defendant
in the civil law realm could not herself usurp the judicial role by stamping
herself as guilty with a plea. Yet, now, many of the post-Soviet republics
have introduced new consensual procedures designed to waive their new,
albeit flawed, adversarial trial procedures. Are they a natural result of the
move to adversarial procedure,66 or a procedural replacement of inquisito-
rial truth-seeking judge with his confession-inducing procedural arsenal?
Avoiding the Trial through Confession or Stipulation to the Truth of the
Charges
On the European continent, the first inroads into the principle of legality,
which required the judge to determine the correct legal qualification of the
charged criminal acts and the legal appropriateness of the sentence based
strictly on the adduced evidence, were allowed only in the adjudication of
minor crimes. Several of the post-Soviet republics have followed this trend
and permit conditional dismissals (diversion),67 penal orders,68 and victim-
offender conciliation (which usually applies only in relation to minor
crimes subject to private prosecution).69 But our emphasis will be on the
procedures relating to more serious criminal offences.70
65 MR Damaška, ‘Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts’ (2004) 2 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 1018, 1022.
66 See M Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 Harvard
International Law Journal 1, 6, 10, who traces this common law adversarial institution
through its ‘translation’ into the inquisitorial language of erstwhile inquisitorial countries.
67 CCP-MO ss 510–511 (requiring a confession); CCP-ES s 202(1).
68 CCP-ES s 261 ff; CCP-LI s 425 ff.
69 It was already included in the CCP-RSFSR s 5(6), relating to cases initiated by
complaint of the victim; see also Model Code s 36(1)(6)); CCP-AR s 36; CCP-BE ss 26(2),
29(1)(5), 30(1)(2); CCP-LA ss 536–38; CCP-LI ss 207, 420; CCP-RU ss 20(2), 319(5);
CCP-TA ss 5, para 1, (3); CCP-UZ ss 582–86 CCP.
70 For a comprehensive analysis of the genesis and application of these forms throughout
Europe and America, see SC Thaman, ‘Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions, and
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In more serious cases, the first clear turn to consensual procedures in
modern Europe,71 came with the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of
1988 with the introduction of the ‘application for punishment upon
request of the parties’, which provided for up to one third discount on
punishment if the bargained sentence was no longer than two years
deprivation of liberty. The patteggiamento was the model for Russia’s new
form of guilt-stipulation.72 There is a tendency, however, to extend the new
consensual procedures to more serious criminal offences. The patteggia-
mento was extended in 2003 to cases punishable by up to five years (after
the up to one-third sentence reduction).73 The Russian provision, applica-
ble to crimes punishable by no more than five years in the CCP-RU of
2001, was extended in 2003 to apply to crimes punishable by up to 10
years imprisonment.74 Guilty plea procedures also apply to all but the most
serious crimes in Estonia and Moldova.75
However, more wide-open, American-style negotiation of charge and
sentence between prosecution, defence and victim, without statutory
discounts, exists in the new Estonian ‘settlement proceedings.’76 American-
inspired ‘co-operation agreements,’ which link plea or sentence bargaining
to the defendant’s aid in the prosecution of others, have found their way
into Georgia, Latvia and Moldova.77 Estonia and Latvia have also adopted
a procedure similar to the giudizio abbreviato introduced in Italy in
1988,78 where the maximum sentence in the event of conviction is reduced
by one-third if the defendant agrees to a ‘trial’ based in the written material
in the investigative dossier. This ‘trial’ is an ironic replica of the classic
written inquisitorial trial of the late Middle Ages, mitigated only by the
Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases’ in K Boele Woelki & S Van Erp (eds), General
Reports of the XVII Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (2007) 951,
964–71.
71 Since the 19th century Spain has allowed a defendant to express his or her conformity
(conformidad) with the pleadings and be punished without trial if the threatened punishment
did not exceed six years. See SC Thaman, ‘Spain Returns to Trial by Jury’ (1998) Hastings
International Comparative Law Review 309–16.
72 I included a procedure based on the Italian model in a chapter on consensual
procedures I drafted for the authors of the CCP-RU of 2001, which was eventually adopted in
modified form. The one-third discount model exists in Russia and Lithuania. CCP-RU
s 316(7); CCP-LI s 440(1).
73 Langer, above n 66, at 49–50.
74 CCP-RU s 314.
75 CCP-ES s 239; CCP-MO s 504(2).
76 CCP-ES ss 245, 248.
77 In CCP-GE s 679–1 ‘co-operation’ in the prosecution of corruption and other serious
crimes can lead to reduction or even dismissal of charges. See also CP-LI s 210; CCP-MO
s 505(1)(1).
78 Thaman, above n 14, at 159–61.
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right given to the defendant, subject to rebuttal by prosecutor and judge, to
testify or to introduce supplementary evidence.79
In Belarus, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and in the Turkmenistan-draft, if the
defendant admits the charges when questioned by the judge, the court,
depending on the seriousness of the charge, may truncate the evidence to a
questioning of the defendant and the victim, move directly to closing
arguments, or even directly to the imposition of sentence.80
Consensual Procedures in Practice
By 2002, 59.8 per cent of all cases in Estonia were handled with the
‘simplified proceedings’ which were in force from 1996 until 2004.81 The
use of the Russian consensual procedure has also grown exponentially
since it was introduced in mid-2002 and has ‘taken root’.82 The same can
be said for Moldova, where plea bargaining resolved around 8.6 per cent
of cases in 2004, 35 per cent in 2005 and 49 per cent in 2006.83
Wide-open American-inspired plea bargaining in Georgia, has been,
however, an unmitigated disaster. An American advisor who worked on
reforming the Georgian law has called it an ‘institutionalised form of
bribery.’84 After the ‘Rose Revolution’ the new government of Mikheil
Saakashvili began targeting members of the ancien regime on corruption
charges and would routinely dismiss charges under the new law if the
accused paid a large amount of money to the government, without even
requiring a guilty admission, much less any kind of ‘co-operation’ which
the original law was intended to encourage.85 A condition of many ‘plea
79 In Estonia, a 1/3 discount is possible in all cases except those punished by life
imprisonment. CCP-ES ss 233, 238. In Latvia, the accused may ‘agree to not require the
taking of evidence during the trial,’ but without statutory discount. CCP-LA s 71(6).
80 CCP-BE s 326(1); CCP-KA s 363; CCP-LI s 269; CCP-draft-TU s 406. Prior to the
2004 CCP-ES, Estonian ‘proceedings’ followed this model. M Sillaots, ‘Admission and
Confession of Guilt in Settlement Proceedings under Estonian Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 9
Juridica International 116, 117–18. A similar provision was introduced in the 1993 Russian
jury law but was seldom used and disappeared in the CCP-RU of 2001. Thaman, above n 6,
at 103–104.
81 Sillaots, above n 80, at 115–16.
82 It was applied in 0.9% of all criminal cases in 2002 rising to 14.3% in 2003 and 2004.
Pomorski, above n 50, at 141. In 2005 the procedure was used in 37.5% of peace court
(misdemeanor) cases, 30% of district court and 2.4% of jury court cases. ‘Statisticheskaia
spravka o rabote sudov obshcheiy yurisdiktsii za 2005 god’ available at http://www.cdep.ru/
material.asp?material_id=90.
83 ‘Statistics of the Procurator General of the Republic of Moldova,’ conveyed to the
author by Alla Panici per e-mail.
84 JD Reichelt, ‘A Hobson’s Experiment: Plea Bargaining in the Republic of Georgia’
(2004) 11 Journal of East European Law 159, 185.
85 Ibid 170–177.
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agreements’ was also the abandonment of allegations of torture or other
unlawful coercion during the preliminary investigation.86
III. THE JURY AS ACQUITTAL CATALYST
The ice is breaking, ladies and gentlemen of the jury! The ice is breaking.87
Juries and Mixed Courts in the Post-Soviet Republics
For the authors of the Concept of Judicial Reform, the logical answer to
the subservient Soviet judiciary and the ‘nodding’ lay assessors, was the
classic jury which would relieve the judge of the duty of determining guilt,
provide the foundation for adversary procedure, and make acquittals
possible. They suggested juries be used in all cases punishable by more than
one year deprivation of liberty,88 and that the ‘nodding’ mixed courts be
abolished.
A number of former Soviet republics eliminated the lay assessors in the
years after independence.89 Constitutional provisions providing for trial by
jury were adopted in Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.90 Provi-
sions for jury trial were also contained in a ‘concept of judicial reform’ in
Belarus in 1992 and were included in the 1999 CCP-BE, only to be
removed later at the behest of authoritarian President Alekxander Lukash-
enka.91 Other than Russia, only Azerbaijan has actually enacted legislation
providing for trial by jury, but its implementation continues to be post-
poned, allegedly on fiscal grounds.92 There is, however, new interest in jury
trial since the ‘colour’ revolutions in Georgia (‘rose’),93 Ukraine
(‘orange’),94 and Kyrgyzstan (‘tulip’).95
86 Ibid 180–81. See also USDOJ, above n 17.
87 Famous winged phrase of the rogue Ostap Bender in the 1928 Soviet novel The Twelve
Chairs, see Il’ia Il’f & Yevgeniy Petrov, Dvenadtsat’ stul’ev (Moskva, Eksmo, 2005) 49.
88 ‘O kontseptsii sudebnoy reformy’ (1991) 44 Vedomosti RSFSR, Item No 1435,
reprinted in Kontseptsiia sudebnoy reformy v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moskva, Verkhovnyy
Sovet Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1992) 41.
89 The mixed court has been abolished in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Moldova. JD Jackson and NP Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication and
Human Rights in Europe’ (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 83, 94.
90 Art 92, para 2, Const-AR; Art 75(2) Const-KA; Art. 47 Const-RU; Arts 124, para 4,
127 para 1, 129, para 2, Const-UK.
91 Kovalev, above n 26, at 132–33.
92 Ibid 129.
93 Art 82(5) Const-GE providing for jury trial was added by law in 6 Feb 2004 and a
draft CCP providing for an American style jury system has been submitted to parliament.
94 Jackson and Kovalev, above n 89, at 120.
95 I have recently received a new draft law proposing the introduction of a classic jury
system: Proekt. Zakon Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki ‘O vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy v nekoto-
rye zakonodatel’nye akty Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki po vprosam uchastiia prisiazhnykh zase-
dateley v ugolovnom sudoproizvodstve’ (hereafter: Draft Jury Law-KY-2007).
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Kazakhstan has taken a path of compromise by introducing a ‘jury
court,’ which began functioning in January of 200796 and is patterned on
the French cour d’assise, consisting in a ‘jury’ of nine presided over by two
professional judges, but in which ‘jurors’ and judges deliberate together as
in a mixed court.97
Based on the successes and failures of the Russian jury system, which
functioned in nine of its regions and territories from 1993 through 2003
and now exists everywhere except in Chechnya, we can attempt to predict
the viability of the future post-Soviet jury systems if they do finally become
a reality.
Avoidance of the Jury in Russia
In Russia and in the prospective systems in other republics, jury trials are
substantively limited to cases of aggravated murder and a smattering of
other crimes.98 In Russia and in all systems, the right to trial by jury
belongs to the defendant and may be waived.99 Despite the virtual
impossibility of obtaining an acquittal in the non-jury courts, a majority of
eligible Russian defendants have waived jury trial, choosing ineluctable
conviction before professional judges. In the years 1994–2001, only 23 per
cent of those eligible proceeded to judgment before the jury court.100 Since
the expansion of jury trial to the rest of the republic defence motions to
have their cases heard by juries have declined to around 18 per cent in
2003101 and to even lower percentages in 2004 and 2005.102 It is clear that
investigators, prosecutors and even defence lawyers pressure defendants to
96 Sud prisiazhnykh v Kazakhstane: pervyy god ne vyshel komom, TSENTRASIA 19 June
2008 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1213858500 mentions the passage of the law, its
going into effect on 1 Jan 2007 and some news of its success.
97 CCP-KA ss 544, 568, 569.
98 CCP-RU s 31(3); CCP-AZ s 362; CCP-KY s 240, as amended by Draft Jury Law-KY
(2007).
99 CCP-RU ss 217(5), 325; CCP-KA s 546, ss 402–5, 402–6 Draft Jury Law-KY (2007);
CCP-AZ s 24(1), and s 13 Draft Jury Law-GE (2005). Trial by jury was mandatory in
pre-revolution Russia, MV Nemytina, Rossiyskiy sud prisiazhnykh 24 (Moskva, Bek, 1995),
as it is in Spain’s new jury system. SC Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 Hastings
Int’l & Comp L Rev 241, 256–58 (1998).
100 In the years 1997–2001 only 39.2% of eligible cases ended up in the jury courts.
Obzor sudebnoy praktiki rossmotreniia ugolovnykh del s uchastiem prisiazhnykh zasedateley,
Biulleten’ verkhovnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 7 (29 July 2002) http://www.
supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=2098.
101 ‘Obzor po delam rassmotrennym sudami s uchastiem prisiazhnykh zasedateley v 2003
godu,’ <http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=165> accessed 15 June 2008 (SCRF-
Jury Review-2003).
102 10.7% in 2004 and 12% in 2005. ‘Statisticheskaia spravka o rabote sudov obshcheiy
yurisdiktsii za 2005 god’ http://www.cdep.ru/material.asp?material_id=90.
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waive jury trial.103 Cases have also been undercharged, so that they will
not be subject to the jurisdiction of the jury courts.104
The raising of the maximum punishability to ten years under the Russian
consensual procedures will not affect trials for aggravated murder or other
grievous offences, but a large swath of lesser crimes will now be subject to
the new consensual procedures, facilitating the avoidance of jury trial.105
Judicial Nullification of the Jury’s Power to Determine Guilt
The Russian legislator rejected the Anglo-American general verdict of
‘guilty’ or ‘not-guilty,’ in favour of a special verdict consisting in a list of
questions, which was adopted by most Continental European countries in
the 19th century.106 The CCP-RU requires that three basic questions be
asked with respect to each crime charged by the public prosecutor: (i) has it
been proved, that the charged offence was committed; (ii) has it been
proved, that the offence was committed by the defendant; and (iii) is the
defendant guilty of having committed the offence. After the trifurcated
guilt question, questions may be asked which modify guilt.107
Such special verdicts fit well in a Continental European system which
requires reasoned judgments, for they compel professional judges, in
writing the judgment, to adhere to the logic of the jurors’ decision.108 They
also make juries more accountable, especially when rendering a guilty
verdict in a serious case.109 The Russian and Azerbaijani codes and the
Georgian and Kyrgyz drafts allow the jury to compel lenience in sentencing
103 Thaman, above n 6, at 87–88. Sergey Pashin, chief author of the 1993 Russian jury
law, shares this view. L Nikitinskiy, ‘Prestuplenie i opravdanie’ Moskovskie novosti, 8 Apr
2003. Defence lawyers’ reluctance to insist on the procedural form more likely to result in an
acquittal can only be explained by: (1) fear that a conviction will be interpreted as an
indication of their lack of skill as a lawyer, which would hurt their career; (2) their
succumbing to pressure on the part of the investigator; or (3) the fact that they are ‘pocket
lawyers.’
104 SC Thaman, ‘Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia’ in N Vidmar
(ed), World Jury Systems (New York, OUP, 2000) 319, 325–26.
105 For an estimate that more than 200 criminal offences are now subject to the consensual
procedures, Petrukhin, above n 33, at 105.
106 Thaman, above n 104, at 338.
107 CCP-RU s 339. The identical verdict form may be found in CCP-KA s 566; and
s 402–22 Draft Jury Law-KY (2007).
108 SC Thaman, ‘Japan’s New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions Regarding Their
Future Form and Procedures’ (2001–2002) St Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal 89,
110.
109 JD Jackson, ‘Making Juries Accountable’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative
Law 477, 520 (2002).
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by the judge which encourages guilty verdicts instead of jury nullification
when jurors fear Draconian judges or sentencing schemes.110
Unfortunately, the SCRF has undermined the jury’s authority to decide
guilt by interpreting the law to restrict jurors to answering questions
related to the factual aspects of actus reus, and thus arrogating to the
professional bench the power to decide mens rea and thereby, the question
of criminal guilt.111 It has also articulated such a confused and contradic-
tory line of cases on which ‘factual’ questions the jury may answer and
which ‘legal’ questions are for the professional judge, that errors in
formulating the question list have been the main reason for reversals of
jury judgments, especially of acquittals.112
The Azerbaijani jury law has abandoned the complicated Russian
question list in favour of two simple questions, one of guilt and another as
to whether the defendant should receive a lenient sentence; and the parties
may request supplemental questions related to lesser-included offences and
mitigating circumstances.113 The most recent draft of the future Georgian
CCP goes the furthest, however, in introducing an American style general
verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ as to each charge.114 The Georgian draft
also follows American law in making jury acquittals final and not subject
to appeal.115
Post-Soviet juries will never function autonomously, as true juries, unless
their (acquittal) verdicts are not subject to arbitrary reversal by the higher
courts. Unlike in the US, the procurator and the victim may appeal
judgments of acquittal.116 Since errors need not be raised in the trial court
to preserve them for appeal, a number of prosecutors and judges have
110 CCP-RU ss 349(2); CCP-AZ s 379(6)(2) allow sentencing below the statutory mini-
mum; whereas CCP-draft-GE s 248 and s 402–31(3) CCP-KY, as amended by Draft Jury
Law-KY(2001), prohibit sentencing to more than 2/3 of the statutory maximum. For a return
to jury sentencing in the US, see A Lanni, ‘Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come (Again)?’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1775.
111 Thaman, above n 104, at 339–40. For a detailed account of the court’s methodology in
doing so, see Thaman, above n 44.
112 Ibid. See also Karnozova, above n 33, 168–260 at 43% of all reversals were related
thereto in the first three years of jury trial and the trend has continued through 2003. SCRF,
above n 101.
113 CCP-AZ ss 369–370. The Ukrainian draft has also followed this model. See Jackson
and Kovalev, above n 89, at 120.
114 The most recent draft of the ‘Special Part’ of the proposed CCP includes such a verdict
in CCP-draft-GE s 243.
115 CCP-draft-GE s 251.
116 Victims can universally lodge appeal whether for review on the facts (appellatsiia) or in
cassation (ie, on mistakes in the application of the law or on procedural errors). For some of
the provisions, see Model Code § 468(1)(3). See also CCP-AR s 404; AR-AZ s 409(1)(2);
CCP-BE s 370(1); CCP-KA s 396(2); CCP-KY s 332(2); CCP-LA s 562(2); CCP-LI s 365(1);
CCP-RU ss 354(1), 370(1), 385; CCP-TA s 329; CCP-draft-TU s 436(2); CCP-UK s 498.
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intentionally committed errors at the pre-trial and trial stage so that, in the
event of an acquittal, the errors may be later raised on appeal.117
Despite the serious nature of the crimes tried in the jury courts, there has
been a much higher rate of acquittals (around 15 per cent) in those courts
than in the regular courts (less than 1 per cent).118 Yet the SCRF has
reversed acquittals at an astonishingly high rate in comparison to convic-
tions: from 1997–2001 it reversed approximately 50 per cent of all
acquittals and only 16–17 per cent of convictions.119 The trend continued
in 2004 with the SCRF reversing 45.8 per cent of all acquittals which were
appealed as opposed to 3.9 per cent of convictions.120
Russian courts have cleverly turned the new rules of adversarial proce-
dure, introduced to protect defendants from Soviet-era abuses, into vehi-
cles for overturning acquittals and other defence-favourable verdicts. Thus
when a defendant successfully suppresses illegally gathered evidence under
the new Russian exclusionary rule it is not infrequent that the prosecutor
or the victim appeals on grounds that their adversary rights have been
violated.121 Once the victim is granted ‘equality of arms’ in an adversary
trial,122 the prosecution has a Trojan horse it can send into the arena to
undermine the adversarial rights of the defendant. The SCRF has not
hesitated to reverse jury acquittals when the aggrieved party has com-
plained of a supposed violation of his or her rights.123
CONCLUSION
Our social life is like swampy, shaky ground. No matter how wonderful a
building is erected on this ground, it vanishes in an unseen manner into this
ground, little by little it is sucked up by this soil.
VD Spasovich124
117 Judges have admitted doing this in Russia. Karnozova, above n 33, at 152.
118 Thaman, above n 104, at 348.
119 W Burnham (ed), The Russian Federation Code of Criminal Procedure (2004) 67.
120 ‘Obzor kassatsionnoy praktiki sudebnoy kollegii po ugolovnym delam verkhovnogo
suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za 2004 god,’ <http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.
php?id=2759> accessed 15 June 2008.
121 For at least 14 acquittal-reversals on this ground, see Thaman, above n 44.
122 For some of the provisions giving victims the same adversarial rights as defendants, see
Model Code ss 91,358 CCP-BE ss 50,292; CCP-KY s 50; CCP-LA ss 97, 99, 454(2),455;
CCP-LI s 27(2); CCP-MO ss 59(7–13), 315; CCP-RU s 42; CCP-TA s 54; CCP-Draft-TU
s 351; CCP-UK s 267.
123 Typically, the SCRF will reverse acquittals when law enforcement organs or the court
have not notified the aggrieved party of the day of the trial or have not allowed them to
engage in some procedural acts. Thaman, above n 44.
124 Quote of famous pre-revolution Russian lawyer, in AM Bobrishchev-Pushkin,
Empiricheskie zakony deiatel’nosti Russkogo suda prisiazhnykh (Moskva, AI Snegirova,
1896) 13.
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Can one change the hierarchic, inquisitorial Soviet system of justice by
introducing alien institutions from the co-ordinate common law legal
sphere? Is a process of ‘Americanisation’ going on, especially in light of the
many American advisers125 who have been involved in the reforms in many
of the former Soviet republics? Can we talk of transplants or translations
of these co-ordinate institutions,126 or merely of their use as democratic
legitimisation for systems reluctant to allow these institutions to be
catalysts for real change? Will the face of justice in these countries reveal in
the end an adversarial American smile, or the ‘two-faced’ smirk of the
entrenched bureaucrats dressed in their new democratic clothes?127
The fact that Russia, where all decry the abysmal quality of criminal
investigations,128 can maintain its acquittal-free system despite the intro-
duction of adversary procedure and jury trial leads one to ask whether this
‘co-ordinate’ edifice is actually only a Potemkin village behind which the
coerced confession and the perfunctory benediction of contents of the file
and accusatory pleading will continue to shape Russia’s criminal justice
reality.129 More frightening is the notion that, with the expansion of guilty
pleas, the charade of an oral, immediate trial will also be dispensed with
and adjudication will recede behind closed doors as in the times of Stalinist
terror. If Russian defendants can be coerced or inveigled into waiving a
15–20 per cent chance of getting an acquittal for the inevitable conviction,
there is no reason to believe that their waivers of trial and acceptance of
the discounted sentence upon guilty plea will be any more voluntary.
A plea bargaining system can only reach just and verifiable results in the
post-Soviet world if it is based on evidence gathered pre-trial that has been
subject to adversarial testing, which can really provide a factual basis for
guilt.130 The post-Soviet codes provide the framework for exclusion of
125 The author has consulted on law reform efforts in Russia, Georgia, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in relation to jury trial, plea-bargaining and adversary procedure.
For criticisms that reforms were instituted just to ‘please foreign experts,’ see Pomorski, above
n 50, at 136.
126 On the ‘Americanization’ thesis and the notion of ‘translations’ in relation to
plea-bargaining, Langer, above n 66, at 4–5.
127 Will the ‘internal dispositions’ among the organs responsible for implementing the
reforms lead to distortion of the original meaning. See Langer, above n 66, at 12.
128 Thaman, above n 6, at 66–68; Pomorski, above n 50, at 146.
129 See Damaška, above n 18, at 544. See B Schünemann, ‘Reflexionen uber die Zukunft
des deutschen Strafverfahrens’ in Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrift fur
Gerd Pfeiffer (Köln, C Heymann, 1988) 482–83, for the opinion that Germany’s trial is a
‘Potemkin facade,’ an ‘orchestrated blessing of the results of the preliminary investigation.’
130 For a provocative model of making an adversarial preliminary investigation the
centerpiece of a consensual based model of adjudication, see. J Wolter, Aspekte einer
Strafprozessreform bis 2007 (München, CH Beck, 1991) 79–91; T Weigend, Die Reform des
Strafverfahrens: Europäische und deutsche Tendenzen und Probleme (1992) 104 Zeitschrift
der gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaft 486, 506–11. For a similar suggestion, see Bernd
Schünemann, ‘Reflexionen über die Zukunft des deutschen Strafverfahrens’ in Strafrecht,
Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht. Festschrift für Gerd Pfeiffer (1988) 482.
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illegally seized evidence but have in no way changed the inquisitorial
pre-trial pre-packaging of the evidence by the prosecuting organs, despite
token and ineffectual grants to the defence of the right to collect evidence
by themselves.131 Although the one-third discount model of consensual
procedure is not as inherently coercive as the wide-open American
model,132 defendants will have no ‘bargaining chip’ until juries become
autonomous co-ordinate decision-makers, not just decoration at an inter-
mediate step in the hierarchical juggernaut of conviction.
The pseudo-oral and pseudo-immediate trial based on the dossier and
guided by its truth-seeking judicial trier of fact, and its procedural
inducements of confessions, which itself has been characterised by some
writers as a form of plea or sentence bargaining,133 at least requires an
in-court confession subject to adversarial testing and a written judgment
founded in the materials of the investigative dossier.134 The more perfunc-
tory the guilty plea and the review of its factual basis, the more risk that
innocent persons will end up at the other end of the conveyor belt.135
131 Kovalev, above n 17, at 319–20.
132 For a discussion on how the latent coerciveness of a ‘bargain’ grows with the greater
gap between maximum punishment and tendered offer see Damaška, above n 65, at 1027–28.
133 In relation to Japan, see DT Johnson, ‘Plea Bargaining in Japan’ in M M Feeley &
Setsuo Miyazana (eds), The Japanese Adversary System in Context: Controversies and
Comparisons (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 142–45.
134 Modern German confession-bargains (Absprachen), are a more honest recognition of
how the inquisitorial trial was really a form of such bargaining. See Thaman, above n 14 at
144–52. See also Langer, above n 66, at 39–46.
135 For a view that negotiation of an in-court confession, rather than a perfunctory
American-style guilty plea better serves the interests of justice in international criminal
tribunals, see Damaška, above n 65, at 1037–38.
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